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Using individual-level data for 35 countries, we investigate the microeconomic determi-
nants of attitudes towards corruption. We consistently find  women, employed, less 
wealthy, and older individuals to be more averse to corruption. We also provide evidence 
that social effects play an important role in determining individual attitudes towards cor-
ruption, as these are robustly and significantly associated with the average level of toler-
ance of corruption in the region. This finding lends empirical support to theoretical mod-
els where corruption emerges in multiple equilibria and suggests that “big-push” policies 
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Curbing corruption has long been recognized as crucial to the success of policy actions. 
An extensive body of literature has by now documented the adverse effect of corruption 
on growth and investment (Mauro, 1995 and Kaufman et al., 1999), on the allocation of 
public spending on education and  health (Mauro, 1997), and, more generally, on the effi-
cient allocation of resources (Krueger, 1974). In parallel, a growing literature has studied 
the determinants of corruption in an attempt to identify effective policy instruments to 
combat it. For instance, corruption has been found to be lower in countries with a higher 
degree of female participation to public life (Dollar et al., 2001, and Swamy et al., 1999); 
with a higher freedom of press (Treisman, 2000); with a higher degree of competition 
(Ades and di Tella, 1999); or with more variable inflation (Braun and di Tella, 2002). 
With the sole exception of Swamy et al. (2001), all of these studies have relied exclu-
sively on cross-country data. However, in the context of the analysis of corruption, cross-
sectional analyses at the country level can be in principle problematic, as they do not dis-
entangle the effect of the variables of interest from country-specific institutional factors 
that are not easily captured by proxies. Furthermore, an in-depth analysis of the micro-
economic determinants of corruption can provide more detailed guidance for the target-
ing of anti-corruption policies.    
 
In this paper we systemically investigate the determinants of corruption at the individual 
level using data from the World Values Survey (henceforth: WVS), a cross-country pro-
gram coordinated by the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan. The 
WVS is a questionnaire on individual values and personal characteristics conducted in 
more than fifty countries, and, among others, contains information on individual’s atti-
tudes towards corruption (see below, section IV, for more details). 
Our work contributes to the existing literature in two distinct ways. First, it enriches the 
understanding of corruption with a detailed analysis of its determinants at the individual 
level across a large number of developed and developing countries. We find women, em-
ployed, less wealthy, and older individuals to be more averse to corruption. These results 
are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including those that account for coun-  3
try and regional fixed effects. Second, it provides evidence that the social environment 
has a strong influence on the individual attitudes towards corruption. We find that, ceteris 
paribus, individuals living in regions where people are on average relatively less averse 
to corruption tend as well to be more forgiving of corruption. This evidence confirms the 
predictions of theoretical models that highlight the importance of social effects. For ex-
ample, in Andvig and Moene (1990), the individual incentive to be corrupt is higher the 
more corruption is widespread, because it is easier to both find corruptible officials as 
well as to escape punishment. In the same vein, Tirole (1996) shows that, because of in-
formation asymmetries, individuals from a group with a bad reputation have less of an 
incentive to behave honestly. 
 
To our knowledge, our results are the first to systematically document the presence of 
social effects in corruption. As it has been argued in the case of development traps 
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943, Murphy et al., 1989, Paternostro, 1997), the presence of social 
effects implies that at the individual level incentives to fight corruption can be low. 
Therefore, from a policy point of view, social effects imply that an effective fight against 




The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the existing literature. Section III 
discusses the empirical specification and related econometric issues. Section IV describes 
the data. Section V presents the results, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Existing literature 
 
Two independent strains of literature provide a framework for our work: studies on de-
terminants of corruption and studies of the effects of social networks. Furthermore, there 
also exists a growing literature that uses the WVS to investigate socio-economic phe-
nomena. We review all three of them below. 
                                                 
1 To be sure, there exist in theory cases where a single, well-targeted policy can act as a “social-multiplier” 
and drive the economy out of a bad equilibrium. Nevertheless, given the persistence and extent of corrup-
tion, and the many unsuccessful spurious attempts to fight it, this does not seem to be the case in practice.   4
  
II.1 Theory and Empirics of Corruption  
Since the seminal contributions of Becker and Stigler (1974) and Rose-Ackerman (1978), 
corruption has often been studied in a principal-agent framework where the government 
(the principal) tries to motivate its government official (the agent) to be honest. Although 
some researchers have argued that a minimal amount of corruption might be efficient be-
cause it removes government imposed rigidities (Leff, 1964, Huntington, 1968), or allo-
cates scarce resources to those with the highest willingness to pay (Beck and Maher, 
1986, Lien, 1986), the leading view is that, overall, corruption has adverse effects on 
growth and economic efficiency. Under a corrupt regime, rent-seeking creates obvious 
distortions (Krueger, 1974). Moreover, agents may also have higher incentives to allocate 
productive resources to rent-seeking rather than production activities (Baumol, 1990, 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991), and government official may increase endogenously 
the amount of red tape in order to extract more rents (Banerjee, 1997).
2 Empirical studies 
tend to confirm this view. Mauro (1995, 1998) finds that higher levels of corruption are 
associated with lower growth rates and that more corrupted governments tend to spend 
more in sectors where it is easier to practice rent-seeking activities. In parallel, Knack and 
Keefer (1997) find that economic growth is higher in countries where people trust each 
other and respect  civic norms. 
 
In a related strand of research, several studies have investigated  how corruption can be 
the result of a bad equilibrium. Andvig and Moene (1990) argue that the higher the fre-
quency of bureaucratic corruption, the higher is the propensity for a bureaucrat to be cor-
rupted; hence, multiple equilibria with various levels of corruption may arise. In their 
model, the equilibrium corruption level depends on both supply and demand effects. De-
mand effects arise because the higher the proportion of corrupted government officials, 
the easier it is for an agent to find a corruptible official. On the supply side, they intro-
duce an exogenous probability of getting caught by another official, but if the supervisor 
is also corrupted the official can bribe the latter in order to keep her job. Hence, the 
higher the number of corrupted officials, the stronger are the incentives for an official to 
                                                 
2 For more detailed reviews of those issues, see Bardhan (1997) and Tanzi (1998).   5
be corrupted.
3 Tirole (1996) analyzes the effects of group reputation on the individual’s 
incentives to be corrupted. He shows that, if the behavior of an individual can only be 
imperfectly observed and the individual’s reputation depends in part on the reputation of 
the group the individual belongs to, agents from groups that had a bad reputation in the 
past may have strong incentives to continue behaving badly. This branch of the literature 
suggests that social effects can have a strong effect on individual behavior. 
 
Finally, an increasing number of studies have investigated empirically the determinants 
of corruption. For example, Ades and di Tella (1999) find that higher degrees of competi-
tion are associated with lower levels of corruption; Treisman (2000) establishes the asso-
ciation of corruption with religion, colonial origins, and the freedom of press; Fisman and 
Gatti (2002) find corruption to be lower in countries with higher fiscal decentralization. 
However, all of these studies rely on cross-country and mostly cross-sectional data on 
corruption and, as a result, cannot analyze the extent to which personal characteristics 
consistently influence individual’s attitudes towards corruption. With the exception of 
Swamy et al. (2001), who find that women tend to be significantly less corrupted, we are 
not aware of empirical studies that analyze the determinants of corruption at the individ-
ual level, or that investigate the relevance of social effects. 
 
II.2 Empirical Literature on Social Networks 
There is a substantial literature on social effects. Evidence of social effects as determinant 
of individual behavior has been found in studies of crime (Case and Katz, 1991, Glaeser, 
Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996, Ludwig, Duncan and Hirshfeld, 2001), welfare partici-
pation (Bertrand, Luttmer and Mullainathan, 2000), health (Katz, Kling and Liebman, 
2001), educational outcomes (Sacerdote, 2001), social mobility (Borjas, 1992, 1994), lo-
cal spillovers and unemployment (Topa, 2001), or shirking behavior (Ichino and Maggi, 
2000). Among these, Ichino and Maggi (2000) is the work most closely related to ours. 
Using data from human resources of a large Italian bank, the authors examine workers’ 
propensity to shirk and find that it depends on individual characteristics, group-
interaction effects, as well as sorting of workers across regions. 
                                                 
3 A similar framework is also analyzed by Cadot (1987).   6
 
These papers either proxy for social effects with average local characteristics or analyze 
the changes in outcomes for individuals who moved to different areas. In this context, the 
main methodological concern is the potential bias due to omitted variables. More pre-
cisely, the network proxy is likely to capture effects other than the network per se, be-
cause individuals with similar unobserved characteristics tend to belong to the same ref-
erence group, or because unobserved group’s characteristics can systematically influence 
the dependent variable. One solution to the problem has been to analyze randomized ex-
periments, such as the Moving to Opportunity experiment in Boston (Katz et al., 2001) 
and Baltimore (Ludwig et al., 2001), or the random assignment of roommates during the 
first year of college (Sacerdote, 2001). Alternatively, identifying the group of reference 
by more than one characteristic allows the use of fixed effect estimation at the local level 
and substantially reduces the potential for omitted variable bias. Bertrand et al. (2000) 
use this methodology to examine the role of social networks in welfare participation. 
They characterize the network of every individual by the language she speaks and the 
neighborhood she lives in: by characterizing the network with two indices (language and 
neighborhood), the authors are able to control for both neighborhood and language group 
unobservables. In our paper, we shall follow a similar approach (see section V.3 for de-
tails). 
 
II.3 Related Works Using WVS Data 
A growing economic literature has also used the World Value Survey to analyze the rela-
tionship between regional or individual values and economic phenomena. For instance, 
Knack and Keefer (1997) use the WVS to build various indexes of social capital, and find 
that social capital is positively correlated with aggregate economic activity. Swamy et al. 
(2001) show that women have on average a less tolerant attitude towards corruption. 
Guiso et al. (2002) study the relationship between the intensity and type of religious be-
liefs and socioeconomic attitudes, such as women’s discrimination and trust in govern-
ment. They find that, although religious people tend to trust others more and be more law 
abiding, people’s attitudes strongly depend on the type of religion. Lastly, MacCulloch   7
and Pezzini (2002) find that people’s revolutionary attitudes depend both on the degree of 
freedom of the country they live in, and on their religious beliefs. 
 
III. Estimation Method 
 
Our main variable of interest is the individual attitude towards corruption. In the survey, 
respondents where asked if “Someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties” is a 
statement they thought can always be justified, never be justified or something in be-
tween, using a coding system ranging from 1 (never justifiable) to 10 (always justifiable). 
Figure 1 presents the share of responses for each category. While 75.4 percent of indi-
viduals value the acceptance of bribes as an action that is never justifiable,  8.8 percent of 
the sample provided a rank of 5 or above thus showing a relatively high propensity to 
condone fraudulent behavior. We use the answer to this question as our measure of the 
attitude towards corruption. We then regress the individual attitudes towards corruption 
(BRIBE) on a set of personal characteristics and values, whose summary characteristics 
are presented in Table 1. 
 
Specifically, we first investigate the determinants of individual attitudes towards corrup-
tion without including proxies for social effects, and estimate our specifications using or-
dinary least squares. Since more than 75% percent of individuals value the acceptance of 
bribes as an action that is never justifiable (which implies a substantial mass point at 
zero), we also performed tobit analyses. However, as results did not change significantly, 
we do not report them here. Estimation results for the basic specification are reported in 
Table 2. In column I we control for unobservables by including country fixed effects, 
while in column II we instead include regional dummies. We find that the estimates of 
personal characteristics are quite robust to the various regression specifications (see the 
detailed description below). 
 
We then investigate the role of social effects. To do so, we first need to identify ex ante 
the reference group that may influence the individual’s perception of corruption (Manski, 
1993). In our case, it is likely that the individual’s attitudes towards corruption depend to   8
a great extent on their interactions with other individuals, as well as on their relation with 
the public administration. It seems therefore reasonable to choose as our reference group 
the different regions within each country, and proxy for the social effect with the average 
of BRIBE within the region where the individual lives (RBRIBE). In addition, the esti-
mation of social effects raise two main methodological concern. The first is the potential 
bias of the coefficient estimate due to the presence of unobservables. For example, 
RBRIBE could capture the effect of national institutions that are likely to be correlated 
with the prevalence of corruption, such as the quality of the jurisdictional system. To cor-
rect for this possible bias, we add country fixed effects to the specification. Nevertheless, 
a similar problem could also arise at the regional level. Since a regional dummy would be 
perfectly collinear with RBRIBE, we address this issue in section V.2 by exploiting time 
differences in RBRIBE across two separated waves of the WVS – a first wave conducted 
in 1990-93 (Wave II) and a second wave conducted in 1995-97 (Wave III, our main data-
set): time variation in regional averages of BRIBE allows us to include regional (time in-
variant) and national (time variant) dummies. Results of this estimation are reported in 
Table 3. 
 
The second methodological concern is the identification of social effects. To clarify this 
issue, we follow Manski (1993) and write our regression as: 
 
( ) ( ) ε γ β η α + + + + = ' | | ' x z E x y E z y  
 
where, in our context, the constant α represents a national dummy capturing the average 
attitude towards corruption in the country as well as a host of unobservable country char-
acteristics, x represents the reference group to which the individual belongs (in our case, 
the region), z represents personal characteristics, E(y|x) is the average answer of the ref-
erence group (RBRIBE), and E(z|x) represents average characteristics of the reference 
group (such as, for example, average education in the region). Manski (1993) defines 
()() γ β ' | | x z E x y E +  as the social effect. More precisely, in Manski’s definition, 
() x y E | β  captures the endogenous social effect purely due to peer effects, while   9
() η ' | x z E  represents the exogenous effect because it depends on the average distribution 
of fundamentals. 
Manski (1993) shows that, unless additional assumptions are made, it is not possible to 
disentangle endogenous and exogenous social effects: in our case, this would mean that 
the estimated coefficient on RBRIBE might reflect both the effect of peer interaction as 
well as the influence of regional average characteristics on the individual attitudes to-
wards corruption. However, as detailed in the introduction, it remains interesting to verify 
whether an overall social effect of either endogenous or exogenous nature affects indi-
viduals’ attitudes towards corruption. To do so, note that, to test whether there are any 
social effects, we simply need to run the following regression: 
 
( ) ε η β α + + + = ' | z x y E y  
 
Under the null hypothesis that there are no social effects at all, estimations of the above 
regression would deliver insignificant estimates of β. Conversely, we can interpret a sig-
nificant estimate of β as evidence of social effects. 
 
To implement the estimation we proceed as follows. First, we drop all countries that have 
only one region, so that only 35 countries are left in the sample (see Table 5). We then 
estimate the average  () x y E i | −  for each region (RBRIBE-i), where the answer of individ-
ual  i is omitted from the regional average. We then regress the individual response 
(BRIBEi) on a country dummy, on personal characteristics, and on the average answer 
() x y E i | −  in the region. Results are reported in Table 2, column III, and Table 3, column 
II. 
 
Last, we choose not to use the weights provided in the WVS. As we shall see in the next 
section, several observations contain missing data. Hence, we perform our multivariate 
analysis without the use of the existing sampling weights.
 4 Consequently, we can not 
                                                 
4 Nevertheless, we still impose uniform weights on individual observations such that all regions have the 
same relevance. This is because we analyze social effects at the regional level, so that the relevant observa-
tion unit is the region, not the individual. Moreover, as in this case we are not hampered by the missing   10
claim our results to be representative at the national or regional level, but rather circum-
scribed to within sample inference.  
 
IV. Data Description 
 
The data set we use for the analysis is the World Values Survey and European Values 
Survey, a cross-country program coordinated by the Institute for Social Research of the 
University of Michigan.  The series is designed to enable a cross-national comparison on 
values and norms on a wide variety of topics. The novelty of the questionnaire is the cov-
erage of a wide array of individual beliefs on politics, religion and economics. It also 
provides information on the demographic characteristics of the respondents and their self-
reported economic profile. All surveys were carried out through individual interviews to 
adults aged 18 or older. Currently, three waves of the WVS are publicly available (1981-
84, 1990-93, 1995-97). In most specifications we only use data from the 1995-97 wave of 
the WVS (Wave III). The third wave of the WVS comprises 55 surveys across 49 coun-
tries for a total of 78,574 individuals interviewed.
5 The typical sampling design within 
each country is a multi-stage random selection of sampling points after stratification by 
region and degree of urbanization.
6 
 
As we are ultimately interested in measuring the impact of social effects at the regional 
level, we had to restrict the sample in a number of ways. First, we eliminated all country 
where the surveys did not contain the variables that are relevant for our analysis (for ex-
ample, information on education was not available for Japan). Second, we excluded from 
the sample all surveys conducted on a regional rather than national scale (in Spain, for 
instance, in addition to the national survey, four additional regional surveys were con-
ducted). Third, to identify social effects we used as a reference group the regional aver-
ages; hence, we eliminated all the surveys that did not contain any regional identification. 
                                                                                                                                                 
value problem, in order to guarantee that RBRIBE is representative at the regional level, we used the WVS 
weights in its computation. 
5 Few surveys were also administered at the sub-national level in Puerto Rico, Tabov District, Montenegro, 
the Andalusian, Basque, Gallician and Valencian regions of Spain, plus a pilot survey in Ghana. However, 
they were not included in our analysis (see below). 
6 For a detailed description of the datasets see Inglehart et al. (2000).   11
Moreover, in order to guarantee some degree of representativity of the regional averages, 
we also excluded all regions with less than forty observations. Finally, a high number of 
individual observations were also dropped because of missing data on relevant covariates 
(see table 8). After these exclusions, our sample consists of 33,780 observations across 35 
countries. In the resulting sample almost 40% of the subjects live in a town with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants, 55% of the subjects have secondary education, 29% define 
themselves as high income, and 24% are Christian orthodox.  
 
To correct for omitted variable bias at the regional level, we also use data from the 1990-
93 wave (Wave II). Although using the 1990-93 wave allows us to exploit time variations 
in the regional averages of individual attitudes towards corruption, there are disadvan-
tages in pooling the two waves together. In particular, Wave II does not include data on 
education for most countries, contains a large number of missing observations and also 
covers a sample of countries and regions that overlaps only partially with that of Wave 
III. Consistent data for our specification were therefore available in both waves for only 
36 regions in 5 countries. 
 
V. Empirical Results 
 
V.1 Basic Specification 
Table 2 presents the regression estimates for all 35 countries. Note that by including na-
tional (or regional) dummies we implicitly run fixed effect regressions, such that every 
estimate has to be interpreted as the deviation with respect to the national (or regional) 
average. Relatively few variables are significantly correlated with BRIBE. However, 
these correlations are robust across the different regression specifications. 
 
Consistent with the findings of previous studies (Dollar et al., 2001, and Swamy et al., 
2001), women seem to be relatively more averse to corruption (lower BRIBE). We do not 
find a correlation between the degree of education and corruption, but richer individuals 
are more likely to accept some degree of corruption; in particular, this effect is consis-
tently significant for high income people. People also appear to be more averse to corrup-  12
tion as they age. Moreover, family values and reported church attendance are associated 
with higher aversion to corruption. Interestingly, different religious beliefs do not seem to 
have a significant impact on BRIBE (with the exception of individuals of Jewish religion 
who consistently report a higher aversion to corruption). Finally, we find that unem-
ployed people display less aversion to corruption. Note that the magnitude of the esti-
mated coefficients is not sensitive to whether the fixed effects are computed at the na-
tional or regional level (Table 2, columns I and II).  
 
We then test for the presence of social effects (column III of Table 2). To do so, we sim-
ply regress BRIBE on the regional average RBRIBE without the observations of the sin-
gle individuals, RBRIBE-i, while controlling for personal characteristics. As discussed in 
section III, we interpret RBRIBE as a proxy for both endogenous and exogenous social 
effects. We consistently find that β ˆ  is significantly different from zero, indicating that 
social effects have overall a significant impact on the individual's perception of corrup-
tion. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect is sizeable – a one-standard deviation in-
crease in RBRIBE is associated with an increase of 30% of a standard deviation in the 
individual attitude towards corruption. Note that the estimates of personal characteristics 
are quite robust across all regressions, even after including the social effect.  
 
V. 2 High vs. Low and Middle Income Countries 
Empirical evidence tends to support the idea that, overall, corruption is associated with 
low economic performance (see, for instance, the reviews of Bardhan, 1997, and Tanzi, 
1998). For example, the correlation between the index of absence of corruption devel-
oped by Transparency International (2002) and real GDP per capita is 0.88.
7 Similarly, 
across the 35 countries in our dataset higher corruption is associated with lower levels of 
development (correlation of -0.3). In particular, 73.3% of the respondents in developing 
countries consider accepting a bribe as never justifiable, while the percentage rises to 
84.6% in more developed countries. In this context, it is interesting to investigate whether 
individuals residing in low/high income countries display structural differences with re-
                                                 
7 The corruption index of Transparency International varies from one to ten, where more corrupted coun-
tries obtain a lower score.   13
gards to their attitudes towards corruption.
8 To do so we run our basic regression as in 
Table 2 for individuals in low and high income countries separately, and then test for 
model equivalence. Interestingly, we obtain that individuals’ behavior is independent 
from the level of development of the country of residence.
9 In other words, despite the 
difference in average responses reported above, individual characteristics and social ef-
fects appear to affect the perception of corruption in the same fashion both in low and 
high income countries. 
 
V.3 Regional Unobservables 
We cannot rule out that, besides the social effect, RBRIBE also captures a regional fixed 
effect. To address this issue, we use data from two consecutive waves of the WVS so that 
we can exploit time variation in RBRIBE while including a regional dummy. More pre-
cisely, when exploiting time differences in RBRIBE for every region, we are able to add 
both regional and country-year dummies. Table 3 presents the results for the sample of 
regions that are both in Wave II and Wave III. In order to keep the sample size as large as 
possible, we have used only a subset of the original explanatory variables: in particular, 
we have dropped educational variables because Wave II did not contain information on 
the individual’s educational level, and we have also eliminated religious beliefs as well as 
number of children because they significantly decreased the number of observations. 
However, in light of the robustness of the results of the previous regressions, we do not 
expect this to significantly alter the estimated coefficient on RBRIBE. 
As for the effect of individual characteristics, the estimates tend to confirm our previous 
results. Women, older individuals, and individuals that have strong family and religious 
values tend to be more adverse to corruption. As for the social effect, we find RBRIBE to 
be still significant (at the 10% level), but with a lower estimated magnitude of 0.36 
(about half the size of the estimated effect in table 2, column III). A number or factors 
can explain the smaller magnitude. First, by adding regional and country-time dummies, 
we analyze whether a higher than average RBRIBE with respect to both the regional av-
                                                 
8 Low/high income countries are defined here as countries with GDP per capita below/above 9000 US $ in 
1995. 
9 The results of the Chow tests performed are F(24,33697)=1.48 for regression (I), F(24,33454)=0.81 for 
regression (II), and F(25,33695)=1.24 for regression (III). Therefore, we can not reject the null hypothesis 
that the two models are equivalent.   14
erage over the two years and the country average of that year has a positive influence on 
the individual perception of corruption. Moreover, this setup is quite restrictive, as it re-
quires that the individual perceptions of corruption respond to changes in the social envi-
ronment within the relatively short period of time that separates the two waves of inter-




Although issues of governance and corruption have been recently at the center of the aca-
demic and policymaking debates, the literature documenting the determinants of corrup-
tion at the microeconomic level is scant. This paper attempts to fill this gap in two dis-
tinct directions. First, using data from the World Value Survey, a large dataset contain-
ing, amongst others, information on personal attitudes towards corruption in more than 50 
countries of the developed and developing world, we consistently find women, employed, 
less wealthy, and older individuals to be more averse to corruption. Second, we investi-
gate the extent to which the social environment influences individual attitudes towards 
corruption. We find that, ceteris paribus, individuals tend to be more forgiving of corrup-
tion in regions where, on average, people are relatively less averse to it. Moreover, the 
social effect seems to be of sizeable magnitude. This suggests that the individual incen-
tives to oppose corruption might be low, and that an effective fight against corruption 
may need to be a coordinated “big push” operating on several fronts at once. 
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Figure 1 Distribution of Answers 
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BRIBE See paper 1.76 1.78 No
RBRIBE Regional average of BRIBE 1.79 0.65 No
SEX Women=1 0.54 0.50 Yes
SECONDARY Has secondary education 0.55 0.50 Yes
TERTIARY Has tertiary education 0.20 0.40 Yes
MIDDLEINC Defines himself as middle income 0.35 0.48 Yes
HIGHINC Defines himself as high income 0.29 0.46 Yes
MIDDLETOWN Lives in a town with 10.000-100.000 inhabitants 0.26 0.44 Yes
BIGTOWN Lives in a town with more than 100.000 inhabitants 0.39 0.49 Yes
YOUNG 18-24 years old 0.07 0.25 Yes
MIDOLD 45-64 years old 0.33 0.47 Yes
OLD More than 64 years old 0.12 0.33 Yes
FAMIMP Gives importance to the family 0.90 0.31 Yes
MARRIED Married 0.75 0.44 Yes
CHILDREN Number of children 2.26 1.42 No
CHURCH Goes to church at least once a week 0.20 0.40 Yes
CATHOLIC Catholic 0.23 0.42 Yes
PROTESTANT Protestant 0.09 0.28 Yes
ORTHODOX Orthodox 0.24 0.43 Yes
MUSLIM Muslim 0.06 0.24 Yes
JEW Jew 0.02 0.13 Yes
OTHERREL Other religion 0.16 0.37 Yes
RIGHT Defines himself politically from the right 0.16 0.36 Yes
CENTER Defines himself politically from the center 0.46 0.50 Yes
FULLTIME Works fulltime 0.37 0.48 Yes
UNEMP Unemployed 0.07 0.26 Yes
RCHURCH Regional average of CHURCH 0.19 0.21 No
RELIND Regional religious fractionalization 0.42 0.21 No
NATION Nation Yes  22
Table 2. Basic Specifications 
Reference categories - for education: primary schooling; for income: low income; for age: 25-44; geo-
graphic: smalltown: <10,000 inhabitants; religion: no religion; political: left wing; employment: self em-
ployed and working part-time. *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: signifi-
cant at the 1% level. 
Dep. Var.: BRIBE (I) (II) (III)
RBRIBE 0.855 ***
20.59
SEX -0.071 ** -0.086 *** -0.089 ***
-2.11 -2.85 -3.03
SECONDARY 0.059 * 0.046 0.046
1.77 1.47 1.50
TERTIARY -0.036 -0.027 -0.024
-0.59 -0.52 -0.46
MIDDLEINC 0.086 ** 0.053 0.067
2.05 1.28 1.56
HIGHINC 0.174 *** 0.127 *** 0.147 ***
3.03 2.68 2.90
MIDDLETOWN 0.046 0.045 0.044
0.89 0.97 1.00
BIGTOWN 0.062 0.031 0.007
1.13 0.54 0.14
YOUNG 0.259 *** 0.261 *** 0.265 ***
2.80 2.76 2.77
MIDOLD -0.164 *** -0.194 *** -0.190 ***
-5.30 -6.00 -6.20
OLD -0.221 *** -0.271 *** -0.264 ***
-4.13 -5.10 -5.22
FAMIMP -0.287 *** -0.299 *** -0.302 ***
-5.12 -5.36 -5.55
MARRIED -0.076 * -0.072 * -0.074 *
-1.78 -1.90 -1.90
CHILDREN -0.021 -0.010 -0.009
-1.50 -0.97 -0.77
CHURCH -0.093 ** -0.071 ** -0.073 **
-2.42 -2.16 -2.19
CATHOLIC 0.087 0.138 * 0.121 *
1.30 1.72 1.76
PROTESTANT 0.028 0.029 0.036
0.60 0.58 0.77
ORTHODOX -0.077 -0.087 -0.078
-1.04 -1.29 -1.29
MUSLIM -0.117 -0.207 ** -0.148
-1.13 -2.07 -1.53
JEW -0.153 ** -0.135 * -0.146 **
-1.96 -1.83 -2.11
OTHERREL 0.087 * 0.056 0.072
1.69 0.92 1.25
RIGHT 0.085 0.096 * 0.076
1.41 1.93 1.56
CENTER 0.039 0.023 0.016
0.96 0.57 0.42
FULL -0.011 -0.013 -0.019
-0.34 -0.45 -0.71
UNEMP 0.155 ** 0.120 ** 0.122 **
2.21 2.27 2.28
CONSTANT 1.941 *** 1.750 *** 0.473 ***
18.19 16.14 3.38
Obs. 33780 33780 33780
Nations 35 35 35
Regions 278 278 278
Dummy National Regional National  23
 
Table 3. Controlling for unobservables: regressions on data from Wave II and Wave III with regional and 
country-year fixed effects 
 
Reference categories - for income: low income; for age: 25-44; geographic: smalltown: <10,000 inhabi-
tants; political: left wing; employment: self employed and working part-time. *: significant at the 10% 
level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. 
Dep. Var.: BRIBE (I) (II)
RBRIBE 0.366 *
1.7










YOUNG 0.265 *** 0.265 ***
4.75 4.74
MIDOLD -0.171 *** -0.171 ***
-4.11 -4.06
OLD -0.214 *** -0.217 ***
-3.01 -3.03
FAMIMP -0.280 *** -0.276 ***
-4.47 -4.45
MARRIED -0.109 *** -0.108 ***
-3.27 -3.34















Dummy Regional Regional  24
Table 4. Country List and BRIBE averages 
 




















Dominican Republic 181 1.82
East Germany 775 1.99 Yes
Estonia 609 1.51












Slovenia 642 1.84 Yes
Spain 663 3556 1.36 1.49 Yes
Switzerland 713 1.51 Yes
Taiwan 909 1.68




West Germany 558 1937 1.82 1.91 Yes